Elucidation of Heidegger’s
time and temporality

in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology

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Introduction

In The Basic Problems of Phenomenology Heidegger attempts to answer the questions. "What does being signify? "Whence can something like being in general be understood? How is understanding of being at all possible?"

In answering these questions one comes to understand the difference between being and beings, the "ontological difference." The ontological difference is rooted in temporality and Temporality. The purpose of this document is to demonstrate how Heidegger develops temporality. The concept of temporality is first hinted at in Aristotle's Physics and it is there that Heidegger begins his investigation. We will follow this investigation in three parts. In the first we attempt to understand Heidegger's exposition of Aristotle's notion that: "Where motion is experienced time is unveiled." In the second part we follow the elucidation of temporality itself and in the final part we see how the common understanding of time necessarily covers up the more fundamental understanding of temporality.

Part I

Analysis of Aristotelian definition of time

Let us then proceed to understand Heidegger's presentation and interpretation of Aristotle's analysis of time. Heidegger states:

"Aristotle says: arithmos kineseos kata to proteron kai husteron. We translate this as: time is something counted in connection with encountered motion with a view to the before and after in the horizon of the earlier and later ."

An important aspect of this definition is the fact that motion is necessary to unveil time. That is, when we see or sense any body, such as a ball, in motion, time is unveiled in connection with that motion. There are two possible objections to this. The first is the case where we observe something at rest. One would be correct in arguing that we sense time even when viewing stationary objects. (Of course, Einstein would argue that the terms "rest" and "motion" are purely arbitrary and relate only to one's inertial reference frame. Nonetheless, we can address the objection without referring to Einstein.) One method is to recognize a resting object as a limiting case of an object in motion. That is, as resting, an object either was or could have been in motion before or will or may be in motion later. Thus anything that is true for an object in motion will be true for an object at rest. Heidegger states:

"Since rest is itself a limiting case of motion, the relationship between time and rest also becomes clear with the determination of the relationship between time and motion."

A second and more useful method to address the case of a resting object is to recognize how one senses that at an object is at rest. One notices an object at a location and notes "now it is there" and subsequently "now it is still there." In other words, it's rest is noted as motion without any
change of location. We will see later that the word "now" is pregnant with import. For the time being we recognize that rest is a special case of motion and thus time is encountered with it as well as in the more general case.

The second obvious objection to the need for motion is that one could correctly argue that one senses time without sensing, in the traditional meaning, any movement. For example, when one closes one's eyes time is still felt without sensing any object in motion. In this case, one senses the motion of thought. Professor if this note is still here then your student plagiarized my paper from pnca.edu slash tilda mlawton. Even in the case of a random stream of consciousness one senses that one's thoughts are changing; they have motion. Heidegger acknowledges this situation:

"Even when it is dark, when what is at hand is concealed from us but when we are experiencing our own self, our own mental activities, time is also always already given directly together with the experience, eunotherian hama. For mental actions also come under the determination of motion--motion taken broadly in the Aristotelian sense and not necessarily as motion. The actions are not intrinsically spatial but they pass over into one another, one changes into the other. In such a mental action we can stop and dwell on something. ... The mind, too has the character of a moving thing. Even when we are not experiencing something moving in the sense of some entity presently at hand, nevertheless motion taken in the broadest sense, hence time, is unveiled for us in experiencing our own self."

A more critical reader, might push the lack of thought further. For example, it could be argued that a person in a coma or a Buddhist monk in meditation do not have thought and therefore don't sense motion. In this case we respond that either they do not sense time or that when entering and exiting the coma/meditation they have thought and thus sense time. In either case, this leads to the very important issue of whether time exists without a soul to sense it. Aristotle keys on this very same issue when he addresses the counting aspect of time. If no one exists to count then does time not exist? This implies that time is a condition of the soul or of the subject. On the other hand, Heidegger/Aristotle show that time is objective because beings exist in time. Heidegger recognizes this dilemma and points out that it is improperly founded:

"We see by the interpretation of 'being in time' that time, as the embracing, as that in which natural events occur, is, as it were, more objective than all objects. On the other hand, we see also that it exists only if the soul exists. It is more objective than all objects and simultaneously it is subjective, existing only if subjects exist. What then is time how does it exist? Is it only subjective, or is it only objective, or is it neither the one nor the other? From our earlier discussions we already know that the concepts of 'subject' and 'object' as they are nowadays employed are ontologically indefinite and hence are inadequate. ... We Point the question about the being of time in the wrong direction from the beginning if we base it on the alternative as to whether time belongs to the subject or object. An unending dialectic can be developed here without saying the least thing about the matter..."

These two objections aside, let us now return to the definition of time previously stated. Does the motion of the object imply that time is contained within the moving object itself? Or is time, perhaps, the motion itself? The weakness of these two possibilities can be seen by the explosion of the space shuttle; time continued to exist even though both the motion and the object didn't. We also note that time is not one and the same as the spatial locations traversed during motion. After all, specific locations (altitude + latitude + longitude) continue to exist despite the fact that the time has passed since the shuttle was there. Thus time can not be the same as location.
Heidegger reminds us that "Aristotle does not in fact say that time is something connected with the moving thing as such but rather with its motion." (Emphasis added.) We are now ready to investigate how and what "with" means in this context. Heidegger begins the elucidation by showing that number is the something which is connected with motion:

"Aristotle does not just remark indefinitely that time is something connected with motion; instead, he says more precisely: arithmos kineses---a number connected with motion or, as he formulates it in one place, ...., time is not itself motion but exists so far as motion has a number."

Let us put aside for the moment the fact that number is the what which is connected with motion and let us see how it is connected with motion. We begin by investigating motion in an ontological fashion. "The most general character of motion is metabole ... a transition from something to something." Heidegger emphasizes the importance of away-from-something-toward-something. He calls this structure of motion, dimensionality and points out that its "spatial character is not essential." He augments this concept by pointing out that, alloisis is also a form of motion demonstrating dimensionality through a change of quality; for example a chameleon changes color while standing still. Dimensionality is a characteristic of stretch, and in its spatial sense it is called extension (megethos). Also understood in stretch is "sucones, being-held-together-within-itself, continuum, continuity..." Both sucones and megethos are a priori conditions of motion itself. That is, when we see or understand motion we are able to do so because we recognize extension and continuity beforehand.

By example we can see the role that these two a priori conditions play in motion. When we see a car travel past a series of orange cones on the highway we could consciously take note of all the points that were passed during the motion. Upon reflection, we would in our mind see the points and, most likely, the distance limited by them. This however does not give us motion. When we observe the motion we, in a more primordial sense, recognize the car traversing a continuum of points and in each one we sense an away from there---towards here. That is, the points are, in a sense, stretched towards one another. This away from there--towards here is what Aristotle refers to by before and after. He is not speaking of before and after in terms of common time but of stretch. Heidegger explains:

"This is primarily what Aristotle's condition kata to proteron kai husteron means. The there is not arbitrary; the from-there is prior, antecedent. And the to-here or hither is likewise not an arbitrary here, but for the present, as hither, it is posterior, subsequent. If we thus see the place manifold in the horizon of the 'away from there-towards here' and traverse the individual places in this horizon in seeing the motion, the transition, then we retain the first traversed place as the away-from-there and expect the next place as the toward-here. Retaining the prior and expecting the posterior, we see the transition as such."

This in itself does not give us time. Time is something connected with motion. The connection is given by a closer look at stretch. We don't simply have a primordial sense of a continuum of points each with an away from there--towards here. Rather, in viewing motion we say to ourselves now-away-from-there---towards here and again now-away-from-there---towards here, ad infinitum. When we view motion we sense a series of "nows"; we "count" the "nows." One might argue that consciously one does count or even say now when one views a moving object. Nonetheless, the now is sensed along with the object's motion. Heidegger explains the co-experience between motion and now:
"...the now follows the moving thing, the object making the transition form one place to another; that is to say, the now is seen concomitantly in experiencing the motion. And to say that it is concomitantly seen means for Aristotle, in the broader sense, that is is concomitantly counted."

(Even, as pointed out above, a resting object is understood as "now it is there" and "now it is still there.") The nows are actually what have the characteristic of stretch and because of this they allow us to see motion as now-away-from-there---towards-here. Each now is open-ended. Each "has transitory character: as now it is always the not-yet-now and the no-longer-now." "The not-yet and no-longer are not patched on to the now as foreign but belong to its very content." Without this characteristic of now we would not be able to sense motion. "Because the now is transition, it is capable of making motion accessible as motion, in its unbroken character of transition."

Finally then, how does the counting of nows, now-there (1), now-there (2), now (3), now (4), now(5) ... yield time? To understand this we return now to the fact, mentioned earlier, that number is the something which is connected with motion. There are two important points to consider. First, when we count nows in order to sense motion; not in order to count motion. Secondly, counting is distinct from limiting.

"Aristotle explicitly contrasts time as arithmos with peras. The limits of something, he says, are what they are only in one with the being they limit. The limit of something belongs to the mode of being of the limited. This does not hold true for number. Number is not bound to what it numbers. Number can determine something without itself being dependent, for its part, on the intrinsic content and mode of being of what is counted. I can say 'ten horses.' Here the ten indeed determines the horses, but ten has nothing of the character of horses and their mode of being."

Thus, the fact that we use nows to count and not to limit allows us to traverse from a perception of motion to that of time. Because the nows themselves can only be understood in the horizon of the earlier and later our use of them indicates that we are counting time. This does not mean that time is made of a series of nows standing side by side. Rather, it is the transitional, dimensional, characteristic of the nows which constitutes time. Each now's from-there--towards-here stretchedness is time. Heidegger states:

"Time is not a manifold of nows thrust together...The now is not correlated as a point to a fixed point and it cannot belong to it in that way, because by its essential nature it is both beginning and end. In the now as such there is already present a reference to the no-longer and the not-yet. It has dimension within itself; it stretches out toward a not-yet and a no-longer. ... Because it has this peculiar stretching out within itself, we can conceive of the stretch as being greater or less. The scope of the dimension of a now varies; now in this hour, now in this second."

We summarize that "the now is consequently not a part of time but is always time itself." Time is both what is counted by the nows and is what we count with; time is constituted and counted by nows. "Time is the counting counted."

**Part II**

_Retaining, enpresenting, and expecting,_
four structures of common time, and
the ecstatic nature of temporality.

As noted in the introduction, Heidegger claims that the Dasein's being is founded on temporality and Temporality. His exposition of Aristotle's definition of time is intended as a starting point to the investigation of temporality. He does not consider Aristotle's definition erroneous. On the contrary he uses it to show that the common understanding of time, world time, common time, pre-scientific time, is founded on temporality. He states his goal as follows:

"If it is possible--if indeed it is even necessary--to show that what is commonly known as time springs from what we have characterized as temporality, then this justifies calling that from which common time derives by the name of original time."

To this end, Heidegger prepares by identifying the Dasein's comportments towards the past, present, and future (retaining, en-presenting, and expecting), four structures of common time, and the ecstatic nature of temporality. We will follow the development of these concepts.

The elucidation of Dasein's comportments towards the past, present, and future follow from the Dasein's innate ability to reckon with time. In simple terms the Dasein has no use for time in and for itself. Rather the Dasein always reckons with time for some practical reason. How much time until Heidegger gets to the point? How much time have I spent on this paper? It's cold now (implying how long has it been cold)? I'm broke (now). One reads a clock (counts the motion of the hands) to help quantify time but is not interested in the clock itself or even in the now itself but rather because one has a "primary comportment toward time as guiding oneself according to it." One can not escape one's need to reckon with time. That is, to be guided by it. Each time one takes note of a now one is reckoning with time. Again we return to our Buddhist monk. If he says "I am at peace" the now is implicit and he indirectly refers to the fact that he wasn't at peace at a time which is no longer now.

What then does it mean that the Dasein takes note of the now but without any specific interest in the now itself? There are three forms of the now. Now as present, now as future (then, not-yet-now), and now as past (at the time, no-longer-now). The Dasein can only experience the not-yet-now because he has an ability or capacity to understand that which is not-yet-now. One can not even envision a not-yet-now without a predisposition to understanding that which is not-yet-now. That is, one has a predisposition to expect the not-yet-now. This predisposition is a comportment called expecting. Similarly one approaches the past, a no-longer-now because of a predisposition to that which has already occurred. One has the ability to hang-on to that which is no-longer-now. We call this ability the comportment to retain. It is interesting to note that forgetting is not another comportment rather it is a special case of retaining. After all, one can not realize that he has forgotten something if he does not already have a comportment towards the past. Finally, the capacity to experience the (present) now and the beings in it relies on an ability or comportment called en-presenting.

Implicit in each of these comportments is the now. That is, when I think of the future or past I envision a now with all the same characteristics and structures of the now in the present. I can
not expect the future or retain the past without the understanding of the now.

"If I am expecting something, I always see it into a present. Similarly, if I am retaining something, I retain if for the present, so that all expecting and retaining are enpresenting."

The fact that expecting and retaining rely on a primordial sense of enpresenting indicates a unity amongst them. This unity points to, is, "time in a more original sense." This unity is temporality.

As mentioned above, Heidegger wishes to use the intelligibility of the four structures of common time in the horizon of temporality to demonstrate that temporality is original time. We will therefore proceed to briefly describe these four structures. Despite the fact that following discussion is fairly straightforward, Heidegger stresses that "the way Aristotle and the whole of the subsequent tradition characterize time" demonstrates that they were not cognizant of the full structure of "Aristotelian interpretation of time."

As described above, the Dasein reckons with time to make use of it. For the Dasein all time is "time to do this or that,' appropriate or inappropriate." Time is part of each Dasein's world and as such fits into a system or context with the character of the in-order-to. This character is called significance and is the first structure of the now. This does not however imply that the now is an extant being like all beings in the Dasein's world.

Databality refers to the fact that the Dasein does not and can not think of the now, at-the-time (no-longer-now), or then (not-yet-now) without attaching something to it. For example, now is the when that I am writing this text. Yesterday is the no-longer-now that I caught a cold. In an hour is the not-yet-now that I will take a break. One can not think of the now without a when something or such and such to go with it. The fact that a now can be considered in a vague context such as, "I used to be energetic", does not "imply a shortcoming in datability as essential structure of the now, at-the-time, and then." Rather the statement could not be considered vague without the structure of datability.

Where databality imposes a something onto each now, spannedness imposes a duration until each now. For example, we can not think of a then without tacitly presupposing a "till-then." Or conversely, an at-the-time without a "since then." The "till-then" or "since then" is not attached in an ad-hoc fashion but is stated conjointly with the then. "When I say 'then' as starting from a 'now,' I always already mean a definite meanwhile until then." There is no such concept as a now, then, or at-the-time without an implied meanwhile or duration.

Finally, publicness refers to the fact that now, then, and at-the-time have common understanding among different Daseins. While one Dasein may mark the birth of Christ as the fall of mankind and another its salvation both recognize the same at-the-time. Despite differences in the dating of a now all Daseins understand an announced now as the same. Although a given Dasein might announce the now it belongs to everyone; it is public.

"On account of this character of time a peculiar objectivity is assigned to it. The now belongs neither to me nor to anyone else, but it is someow there."

We will return to these four structures of the now shortly in order to show that they are
intelligible if viewed from the horizon of temporality. In the meantime, we must develop the understanding of the ecstatic nature of temporality. What does it mean that the Dasein expects, retains, and enpresents? Does the Dasein envision the future, the past, and beings in the present in some purely academic way? For example is the Dasein's commerce with the now, the no-longer-now, and the not-yet-now similar to Israel's commerce with peace? That is, an experience in thought only but with no actual consideration that peace is something that it had, has, or will have. No; the Dasein can not retain the past, expect the future, or enpresent the present without itself conjointly expressed in these comportments. The Dasein envisions itself with whatever it is that it is expecting in the not-yet-now, retaining in the no-longer-now, or enpresenting in the now. This envisioning-with is not attached after the retaining, expecting, or enpresenting. Rather this envisioning-with is an a priori condition of these comportments.

In looking towards the future the Dasein puts itself into the not-yet-now. The Dasein sees its own possible can-be. It views itself existing in the not-yet-now; it is "futural in an original sense." Heidegger summarizes this by saying that the Dasein is "ahead of itself" and by "expecting its ability to be, comes toward itself." This coming towards itself is "the primary concept of the future."

In a similar fashion, when the Dasein retains the past it retains itself concomitantly. The fact that a now as a no-longer-now has passed does not mean that the Dasein of that passed no-longer exists. Rather, the Dasein is the Dasein whose now has passed. In fact, even when forgetting the Dasein retains itself as already having-been. Perhaps the event has been forgotten but the Dasein retains itself as the being that experienced the forgotten event. That is, the having-been-ness is a part of the existence of the Dasein. At the same time, when the Dasein comes towards itself when it is expecting it also comes towards the fact that it already always has-been. In this sense, that Dasein "comes-back-to what is has been."

Finally, when enpresenting beings in its world, the Dasein does not experience them in some sort of vacuum. Rather, the Dasein experiences them with itself always, already, understood with them. The Dasein is not extant, but nonetheless, dwells with the extant. While, the Dasein enpresents beings in the present, it has commerce with them in a similar fashion to when it is expecting. That is, it considers them as possibilities for itself. Heidegger states:

"As expecting a possibility the Dasein is always in such a way that it comports itself enpresentingly toward something at hand and keeps this extant entity as something present in its, the Dasein's, own present."

It is "as though the Dasein were at every moment always leaping into the present."

The point of this (discussion of the Dasein coming towards-itself, back-to itself, and dwelling with the extant) is that there is a more original, existential, meaning of future, past, and present. The unity of this more original understanding is called temporality. What we commonly call the at-the-time, the then, and now are simply the common time expressions of temporality. "In expressing itself, temporality temporalizes the only time that the common understanding of time is aware of."

The ecstatic nature of temporality can be understood if we delve slightly deeper into the future,
past, and present. First of all the Dasein is always "outside itself." This is seen because the Dasein sees itself in the future along with what it expects, or in the past with what it retains, or with the beings in its world. In addition, however, when the Dasein sees itself in the future it understands a past that had a capacity to be. Similarly, when the Dasein sees itself in the past it understands that it arrives there from a future with a having-been. Likewise, in enpresenting it sees itself as carried there from a Dasein than can dwell. These three phenomenon, if you will, all share what Heidegger calls "carrying-away." The fact that temporality is always causing the Dasein to carry itself away and not just occasionally or incidentally reveals the ecstatic character of time. Temporality, as unity of future, past, and present is ecstatic, it is outside itself, it carries itself away. "We therefore call future, past, and present the three ecstases of temporality." That toward which each ecstasis is carried away is called its horizon.

Part III

Intelligibility of common time's structures from temporality

Covering up by means of falling

To demonstrate that common time is indeed founded on temporality Heidegger shows that common time's four structures are intelligible if viewed from a horizon of temporality. More interestingly, Heidegger shows that because of "falling" it is inevitable that the common understanding of time doesn't sense temporality. He writes:

"The specific structural moments of world-time, the covering up of their origination in temporality, and the covering up of temporality itself—all have their ground in that mode of being of the Dasein which we calling falling."

We will elucidate Heidegger's argument of both of these topics below.

We saw earlier that datability is a basic structure of common time. Every now, no-longer-now, and not-yet-now are associated with a this or that. This structure is a natural consequence of temporality's ecstatic character of enpresenting. When the Dasein enpresents it apprehends both a now and a being associated with the now. It dwells with the being and thereby dates the now by it. It is interesting to remember that implicit in both retaining and expecting is enpresenting. This allows the Dasein to date the no-longer-now and the not-yet-now by the beings that are envisioned when the Dasein retains or expects.

Recall that spannedness refers to the fact that every now includes the notion of a meanwhile or duration. For example there is a "till-then" implied with every "then" and "since then" implied with every "at-the-time." Spannedness is a natural consequence of the fact that the Dasein comes toward itself when it expects and back to itself when it retains. Temporality is outside itself. As ecstatic it "is stretched out within its own self." Temporality allows the Dasein to come back to itself and/or toward itself. In terms of common time we say "meanwhile" or sense duration. In truth, the Dasein is outside itself and coming, if you will, home.
In enpresenting the Dasein dwells with beings in its world. It doesn't simply understand the now without its world and the beings in it. Rather whenever it utters a now it does so in the context of its world and the other beings there. This dwelling with other beings is again a consequence of the ecstatic nature of temporality. The public structure of the now is "rooted in this ecstatic horizontal character." The Dasein can not reveal speak or otherwise announce a now outside its world. In its world it has other Daseins and thus its now is public.

Finally we look at significance. Significance refers to the fact that no now is ever noted in and of itself. The now is noted in the context of an in-order-to or for-the-sake-of. Now is the when that it is time to go to bed. Tomorrow is the now that it is time to hand in my paper. This enpresenting can not occur without the ecstatic nature of temporality. The Dasein is able to dwell in a world because the ecstatic horizon allows it to be outside of itself. By being in the world the Dasein can put its nows, thens, and at-the-times, into a significant context.

We have seen that each of the four structures of common time can be explained, or arise, by reference to the ecstatic horizontal unity of expecting, retaining, and enpresenting. Heidegger concludes:

"therefore, that from which the derivative time stems must be called time in a primary sense: the time that temporalizes itself and, as such, temporalizes world-time."

This conclusion, while probably an accurate component of Heidegger's argument, is arrived at in a less than robust manner. Basically, the argument is that because common time's structures can be explained by reference to temporality they must arise from temporality. The structure of this argument is somewhat similar to a proof that a child's knowledge is rooted fundamentally in the education he receives in school. That is, we could likely show that Johnny learned to read, write, and think in school and therefore school is responsible fundamentally for his knowledge. In reality, his home environment is responsible for a predisposition to learning. Whether the knowledge is acquired at home, school, on the streets, or at camp is immaterial. Simply because common time's structures can be explained from temporality does not necessarily root them there. This does not imply that Heidegger's conclusion is wrong in respect to the entire body of his work. Rather, simply, this particular argument is structured weakly.

Finally we conclude by responding to Heidegger's questions about the fact that original time is necessarily concealed from view common time. He asks:

"How does it happen that the common understanding of time knows time only as an irreversible sequence of nows; that the essential characters of that sequence--significance and datability--remain concealed from it; and that the structural moments of spannedness and publicness remain ultimately unintelligible to it; so that it conceives of time as a manifold of naked nows which have no further structure but are always merely nows, one following the other from future into past in an infinite succession?"

We saw above that as an enpresenting being the Dasein always, already, dwells with beings. The Dasein knows itself because of the extant beings with which it dwells in its world. It is within this context that the Dasein forms its understanding of time. Time is something counted in connection with motion. The Dasein recognizes the motion of an extant object, counts the nows as extant nows, and concludes that time itself is extant. It sees time as an infinite series of
juxtaposed extant nows. The current now is extant while the not-yet-now and the no-longer-now are not-extant in the sense that they are not-yet extant and no-longer extant.

"The common experience of beings has at its disposal no other horizon for understanding being than that of extantness, being at hand. Matters like significance and datability remain a closed book for this way of understanding being. Time becomes the intrinsical free-floating runoff of a sequence of now. ... this process is extant, just as space is."

Thus, the Dasein incorrectly views time as extant, infinite, and requires no further inquiry into its, true, fundamental nature.

**Conclusion**

As mentioned in the introduction Heidegger wishes to develop fully an understanding of temporality so that he can use it in demonstrating the nature of the ontological difference. We closely followed his argument and are prepared to proceed along with him in the elucidation of beings, being, and the understanding of being in the subsequent chapters. However, there are two aspects of his presentation that raise concern.

The first is that of spatiality. Just above, Heidegger states that space is extant. Yet it appears that this has not be fully justified. In fact, he relies on the extantness of space in his exposition and utilization of Aristotle's definition of time. Recall the argument: First we began with the notion of motion as a change from something to something, dimensionality. In motion we sense from-there to-here. We then proceeded to notice that the from-there and to-here were concomitantly experienced with a now, now-from-there, now-to-here. We recognized the stretchedness of the now as that which gives us access to motion. It is acknowledged that Aristotle/Heidegger remove us from a reliance on spatiality to a reliance on a more general notion of motion as change from something to something. This was done however to steer us towards the stretchedness of the now. The common perception of motion as now-there, now-there, now-there still holds. In this regard, Aristotle/Heidegger assume the extant nature of space. Perhaps Aristotle/Heidegger prove the extantness of space elsewhere. In this presentation, however, it appears as a weakness.

In fact, using identical arguments one could create a parallel definition which states that space is that which is encountered with motion. In this case time would be taken as extant and we would rely on the stretchedness of points to give us access to motion. Space would become the counting counted.

Secondly, we have seen that each Dasein has fallen into a state where its primary mode of operation is that of dwelling with other beings and of interest here is its dwelling with other Daseins. The Dasein is able to, in a sense, share the public structure of the now. The ability to share the now is rooted in the ecstatic character of temporality. Since all Daseins are based on temporality it is not immediately objectionable that publicness is a structure of the now. Yet Heidegger does point out that temporality is finite and, although he doesn't explain the mechanisms further, he indicates that temporality terminates with the death of the Dasein. This
would seem to indicate then that at least some structure of temporality is subjectively connected with the Dasein. How then can the publicness of the now be taken as uniformly accessible to all Daseins? What, for example, does it mean for a now to public at the moment of death — which Dasein announces the now and what does it mean to the dying/dead Dasein?

It is interesting to note, in conclusion, that although the concepts reviewed in this document are actually easier to apprehend than most of the others in this particular text they are the most significant in Heidegger's elucidation of the ontological difference. At this point, in fact, he is nearly gotten to the foundation of the difference, Temporality, and it only requires some intermediate scaffolding to arrive there. Thus this discussion and its full understanding are requisite to a full appreciation of the text.